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POLICY CHALLENGE
To meet the EU's objectives for emissions, electricity supply and gas
security of supply, well-designed European markets could provide better
results at lower cost than uncoordinated national approaches. In other
areas – such as energy efficiency and supporting innovation – markets
alone might not be enough. Europe should thus rethink its quantitative
headline targets for 2030. The proposed 40 percent decarbonisation
target is in line with a stronger emission allowance market, but the target
for renewables should be
defined in terms of inno-
vation rather than
deployment, and the
energy-efficiency target
should be defined in terms
of encouraged energy and
cost savings, not the
amount of energy con-
sumed in a certain period.
Core instruments for a consistent energy strategy
THE ISSUE European Union energy policy is guided by three objectives:
sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. To meet its goals in
these areas, the EU is updating its energy strategy with new targets for
2030. The starting point for this is the assessment of the previous EU cli-
mate and energy package, at the centre of which were the 20-20-20 targets
for 2020. Although the EU is largely on track to meet these targets, EU
energy policy is generally not perceived as a success. Recent events have
undermined some of the assumptions on which the 2020 package was
built, and the policies for achieving the 2020 targets – although at first
sight effective – are far from efficient. 
Source: Bruegel.
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ELEMENTS OF EUROPE’S ENERGY UNION
1. Energy efficiency
target: 20 percent
reduction in final
energy consumption
compared to projec-
tions; renewables
target: 20 percent in
gross final energy con-
sumption; emissions
target: 20 percent
reduction compared to
1990.
2. http://www.eea.
europa.eu/publica-
tions/european-union-
greenhouse-gas-
inventory-2014.
3. Which would allow
existing fossil-fuel
plants to continue to
operate by mitigating
their emissions.
THE EUROPEAN UNION IS
LARGELY ON TRACK to meet the
so-called 20-20-20 climate and
energy targets1, which were seen
as quite ambitious when they
were adopted in 2009. EU final
energy consumption fell by 7 per-
cent from 2005-11 (Figure 1),
energy production from renew-
able sources increased by 4.2
percentage points from 2005-12
(Figure 1) and greenhouse gas
emissions dropped by 13 percent
in the same period (Figure 2). By
2012, emissions were already
19.2 percent below the 1990
level, leaving just a small gap
before the EU meets the 20 per-
cent reduction target for 20202.
However, EU energy policy is gen-
erally not perceived as a success.
Recent events have undermined
some of the assumptions on
which the 2020 package was
built, and the policies for achiev-
ing the 2020 targets – although at
first sight effective – are far from
efficient.
In terms of supply security, the
Ukraine crisis has shown that
energy efficiency and increased
deployment of renewables have
been so far insufficient to eliminate
Europe’s reliance on Russian gas. 
In terms of sustainability, other
major emitters have not whole-
heartedly followed the EU lead to
cut emissions. New fossil energy
resources make it more difficult to
believe that such a global agree-
ment is feasible because it would
imply not using most of the fossil-
fuel bounty. So the global impact
of Europe's emission reductions
will be close to insignificant, while
Europe’s decarbonisation strat-
egy turned out less ambitious
than originally claimed, because
the recession (and some other
factors) supplied much of the
promised emissions reduction. 
In terms of competitiveness, vari-
ous developments have made the
energy mix envisaged in 2008 rel-
atively more expensive. The
Fukushima accident resulted in
the closure of cheap nuclear
plants while increasing the
already high cost of new nuclear.
It also became clear that carbon
capture and storage technology3
is unlikely to become competitive
any time soon relative to other
low-carbon electricity generation
technologies. Consequently,
decarbonisation in Europe might
have to rely even more on vari-
able renewables, which is likely to
drive up the cost of the transition.
Meanwhile, the US shale gas
boom caused a widening transat-
lantic energy price gap. All this
happened during the EU’s most
severe economic crisis, and
shifted the focus of policymakers
from long-term industrial policy
projects such as developing
renewables, to defending the
competitiveness of sectors such
as energy-intensive steel plants.
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Figure 1: Share of renewable energy in gross final energy
consumption (%, left scale); EU energy efficiency (right scale)
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Figure 2: EU emissions
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4. To have a fair chance
of keeping global warm-
ing to no more than 2
degrees Celsius, global
emissions would have
to decline by about 60
percent by 2050; which
translates into 80 to 95
percent by 2050 for
industrialised countries
(IPCC, 2007).
5. According to the
Commission’s impact
assessment, a 40 per-
cent emissions cut
automatically implies a
27 percent renewable
energy share in 2030.
6. For example, increas-
ing the share of certain
expensive, variable
renewables could help
to meet the target while
it has only adverse
effects on competitive-
ness and supply
security without imply-
ing any emission
reduction.
7. Consumers are faced
with nationally regu-
lated tariffs. Electricity
transmission is organ-
ised nationally.
Capacity mechanisms
and renewables sup-
port schemes are
organised nationally,
and corresponding
services are not trad-
able across borders.
carbon investment and allows
the political decarbonisation
instruments – such as emis-
sion trading – to be boosted
without excessive cost. It
therefore keeps the door to a
more aggressive decarbonisa-
tion policy open, should other
major economies join the
battle. But the target is less
than optimal to deliver
Europe's share of the global
2050 objective4.
• The 27 percent renewables
target is essentially insignifi-
cant5. Its main justification is to
form the legal basis for
national renewable support
schemes that might otherwise
be challenged for undermining
the internal energy market.
• A 30 percent energy efficiency
target would be an acknowl-
edgement of the importance of
efficiency to achieve the
energy policy objectives. But
the case for the chosen metric
and the corresponding number
is weaker than that for the
other two targets.
The proposed quantitative targets
testify to the prioritisation within
EU energy policy – 40-30-27
instead of 20-20-20 – but are not
a consistent strategy to respond
to the changing energy policy
challenges6. The strategic task is
to translate the prioritisation of
objectives and the interaction
between instruments into a con-
sistent policy framework.
From a strategic perspective, it is
important to note that it is impos-
sible to determine which menu of
investments is most conducive to
achieve security of supply, sus-
tainability and competitiveness
of energy supply. So the main role
of policy is to develop reliable
frameworks that will encourage
the investment that will enable
stable energy services at the
lowest direct and external cost.
A well-functioning internal energy
market is the core of such a
framework, complemented by an
equally well-functioning Euro-
pean market for emission
allowances and a market for
supply security. Europe also
needs an ambitious framework to
speed up low-carbon innovation.
The final element is a system to
make energy efficiency policies
at different levels of government
comparable in order to come up
with the best mix.
REVAMPING THE MARKET
A functioning internal energy
market in which companies and
technologies freely compete to
provide the best services at the
lowest price, while respecting
societal and environmental con-
straints, could be hugely welfare
enhancing. Despite three EU legal
packages, neither the provision-
ing of gas nor of electricity is
organised in such markets. In
electricity, the attempt to create a
European market by coupling
national day-ahead markets
proved only partially successful.
While national prices have some-
what converged, no internal
electricity market has developed
because important parts of the
electricity sector are still subject
to widely differing national rules
and arrangements7. Investment
decisions in the electricity sector
are thus based on national poli-
cies, not European markets. This
non-cooperation is costly, and the
corresponding welfare loss is set
In addition, the 2020 climate and
energy policies have inherent
problems. Decarbonisation has
been mainly delivered by a com-
bination of economic downturn
and renewables policy (CDC,
2014). Consequently, the EU
emissions trading system (ETS) –
which would have been able to
identify much cheaper abatement
options – was barely used. Fur-
thermore, most investments in
power plants, networks and con-
sumption have been based on
national remuneration schemes,
undermining the internal energy
market and failing to deliver a
well-balanced European energy
system that could support the cli-
mate and energy policy
objectives.
Nevertheless, the EU package for
2020 was a valid hedging strat-
egy in a world of scarce and
expensive energy. It addressed
the questions of its time, and
could have been quite effective in
a scenario that saw renewable
energy quickly become indispen-
sable in all parts of the world.
Now, European Commission pro-
posals for 2030 foresee an
emissions reduction of 40 per-
cent and a 27 percent share of
renewables (European Commis-
sion, 2014). There is also some
momentum for a binding energy
efficiency target that could be set
at 30 percent. The differentiated
increase in the three targets indi-
cates a change in priorities:
• The 40 percent emissions
reduction relative to 1990 is a
compromise. It is an ambitious
unilateral target as long as
there is no global agreement. It
provides a signal for low-
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to increase with the rising shares
of renewables in the power
system8.
A European electricity market will
not spontaneously evolve based
on the enforcement of some first
principles. Functioning electricity
markets need to be designed:
products need to be defined and
schemes for their remuneration
need to be engineered. An effi-
cient market design needs to
include all parts of the relevant
system. It must ensure efficient
incentives for trade-offs such as
demand response versus stor-
age, transmission lines versus
decentralised generation or solar
versus lignite. And to be efficient,
this design needs to be European. 
The first step is to ensure that
national energy regulations are
not used for domestic industrial
or social policy. Regulated final
consumer tariffs in France below
what the market would offer, the
same electricity price in south
and north Germany despite a lack
of interconnection, or paying pre-
miums to domestic plants –
which is essentially what capac-
ity mechanisms and renewables
support schemes do – are all
inconsistent with a functioning
internal market.
This implies that the fuel mix pre-
rogative of the member states
should be restricted to prefer-
ences against certain
technologies, such as ‘no nuclear
in Germany’ or ‘no shale gas in
France’. While restricting certain
technologies, if done transpar-
ently and predictably, would be
consistent with a functioning
European market, there can be no
European market if member
states prescribe certain fuel
mixes, such as ‘more than 40 per-
cent of electricity from German
renewables in Germany’ or ‘more
than 80 percent of Polish electric-
ity from Polish coal’.
Given the substantial distributive
effects9, a European energy
market requires accountable gov-
ernance. Market designs need to
be regularly adapted to changing
circumstances, so the gover-
nance structure needs to be
institutionalised.  But, the Euro-
pean Commission
has neither been
given the authority
to strike a deal
between vested
interests, nor does
it possess the man-
power for such a
complex task10.
Consequently, the
Commission relies on selected
stakeholders to negotiate com-
promises over individual issues11.
To develop a truly functioning
internal market, the Commission
needs to prepare a fourth legal
package outlining the European
energy market framework. This
should not shy away from curtail-
ing the role of national energy
policymaking. It should propose
one or several generic market
designs. The European Parliament
and Council should then decide
which of those generic designs
should be developed further.
Because of the complexity, the
substantial information asymme-
tries between stakeholders and
the significant redistributive
effects, this task of developing a
market model should be
entrusted to a well-staffed and
accountable institution that will
also be responsible for the ongo-
ing implementation of the
design12 – for example, the
Agency for the Cooperation of
European Regulators (ACER). This
would, however, require
resources matching its responsi-
bility13 and an overhaul of the
decision-making process. The
final design would then be ratified
by the European Parliament and
Council.
Creating a functioning internal
energy market would be a major
shift that will not be
achieved through
smooth conver-
gence of national
markets. The alter-
native would be to
return to a system
of more-or-less
managed national
electricity systems
– with some unreliable cross-
border exchanges of energy. This
would not only make the systems
less efficient. It will also make
national security of supply more
costly, and deployment of renew-
ables beyond a certain level
prohibitively expensive.
RE-ESTABLISHING THE ETS
The ETS covers most carbon-emit-
ting industries and will run
indefinitely, with a shrinking
annual supply of allowances. It is
an effective and efficient tool to
mitigate emissions14.
But, the price of ETS allowances
has collapsed because of an over-
supply15 and the undermining of
the system’s credibility. The risk
in these developments is that the
ETS gets replaced by less-effi-
cient national, sectoral and
8. Zachmann (2013b)
shows that in a highly
stylised scenario with
high shares of renew-
ables, moving from
individually optimised
power plant fleets in
Spain and Germany
towards a jointly opti-
mised power plant fleet
could save seven per-
cent of the total cost of
electricity.
9. Even minor technical
harmonisation (such as
adjusting the gate-clo-
sure times for reserving
transmission capacity)
have distributive effects.
More structural deci-
sions over renewable
support schemes or
capacity mechanisms
might easily shift bil-
lions of euros between
countries, between pro-
ducers and  consumers
and between different
producers.
10. The energy market
is much more complex
and sizeable than the
ETS (Electricity repre-
sents about 2 percent
of EU GDP, while emis-
sion allowances
represent about one
tenth of a percent.)
11. One prominent
example, is the devel-
opment of ‘network
codes’ that should
ensure sufficient har-
monisation of national
market rules.
‘A European energy
market requires
accountable gover-
nance and curtailing
of the role of national
energy policymaking.’
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12. Delegating powers
to community agencies
faces legal constraints
(‘Meroni Doctrine’)
which have been dis-
cussed in the context of
the institutions of the
‘Banking Union’.
13. In addition to
increasing the
manpower, resources
should also include
open models of the
European energy
system in order to have
a common basis of
discussion. 
14. See Zachmann
(2013a).
15. Between 2008 and
2012, about 2 billion of
the 10 billion issued
allowances were not
used because of the
recession (500 mil-
lion), inflow of
international carbon
credits (1420 million),
exceptional allowances
allocated in 2012-13
(500 million), replace-
ment of fossil plants by
publicly supported
renewables (200 mil-
lion) and energy
efficiency measures
(150 million).
16. The percentage
values (1.74 percent
and 2.2 percent) refer
to the average total
quantity of allowances
issued annually in
2008-2012. That is the
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workability of such a mechanism
are highly disputed19.
A more promising way to effec-
tively shield the ETS from political
interference would be to ensure
that future policymakers that
decide to undermine the ETS have
to compensate companies that
invested based on the claims
made by policymakers today that
the ETS is stable.
This could be organised through
private contracts between low-
carbon investors and the public
sector. A public bank could offer
contracts that will pay in the
future any positive difference
between the actual carbon price
and a target level20. Low-carbon
investors would bid to acquire
such contracts to hedge their
investments. This would produce
three benefits. First, the public
bank would be able to collect
money upfront (a sort of insur-
ance premium) and make a profit
if a sufficiently tight climate
policy is maintained. Second, the
private investor significantly
reduces its exposure
to the – political –
carbon market and
hence accepts
longer pay-back
times for its invest-
ments. This would
unlock long-term
investment that is
currently too risky. Third and most
importantly, public budgets
would be significantly exposed to
the functioning of the ETS. If
future policymakers take deci-
sions that increase the number of
available allowances, they might
be called back by their treasuries
because this would activate the
guarantees pledged to investors.
This would serve as a much more
credible commitment to preserve
the integrity of the ETS.
SUPPLY SECURITY
The EU's perceived vulnerability
to a reduction in gas (and oil) sup-
plies from Russia in the context of
the Ukrainian crisis has put
supply security back on the
agenda21. 
Security of gas supply is not pri-
marily about reducing import
dependency or increasing
Europe’s negotiating power with
foreign suppliers. Rather, it is
about maintaining unused alter-
natives that could be tapped into
for an indefinite period in case the
most important supplier fails for
technical or political reasons.
There is a long-standing debate
about whether completing the
internal market will deliver supply
security. A functioning internal
market offers the most efficient
rationing mechanism during
crises and market-based long-
term prices in Europe ensure that
suppliers have the right incen-
tives to develop new sources. On
the other hand, the market –
which typically goes for the
cheapest available source –
might fail to sufficiently diversify.
For example, the current market
design will not provide infrastruc-
ture to connect sources that are in
normal circumstances uncompet-
itive, but which serve as
insurance in case the cheapest
supplies become unavailable.
But managed approaches, such
as providing security via public
investment in certain infrastruc-
ture, could crowd out private
time-inconsistent measures. A
revamp is therefore important to
incentivise the use of current low-
carbon alternatives (for example
burning gas instead of coal) and
to ensure low-carbon investment.
The European Commission pro-
posal to revamp the ETS is (1) to
increase the speed by which the
annual allocation of allowances
are curtailed from 1.74 percent to
2.2 percent every year after
202017 and (2) to introduce a
‘market stability reserve’ through
which any surplus of allowances
above a certain level will be
removed from the market, and
reintroduced when the surplus
falls below a certain level.
Steeper reduction of annual
allowance allocations after 2020
is a sensible step to ensure that
Europe plays its part in the con-
tainment of global warming. There
is however a risk that the sectors
covered by the ETS could fall out
of step with the emission reduc-
tions in sectors that do not fall
under the ETS, such as transport
and heating. For
example, electricity
for electric vehicles
and heat pumps falls
under the ETS, while
combustion-engine
cars and oil heating
do not. The most ele-
gant solution to
avoid different carbon prices for
different technologies would be to
extend the scope of the ETS to all
relevant sectors18.
The Commission's proposed
‘market stability reserve’ is
intended to avoid politically
motivated intervention in the
market. But the use and
‘Security of gas
supply is about
maintaining unused
alternatives that can
be tapped into.’
investment if not properly
shielded from the market. If, for
example, Europe financially sup-
ports a pipeline from
Turkmenistan, the business case
for the corresponding volume
from the Levant region might dis-
appear. Furthermore, national
managed approaches regularly
fail to select the most efficient
options (eg demand curtailment,
storage, LNG plants, pipelines,
domestic production, domestic
fuels).
So neither the current market
design nor ad-hoc managed
approaches appear well suited to
efficiently ensure gas supply
security. We therefore propose a
market for ‘reserve supplies’.
Each domestic gas supplier would
be legally required to maintain a
certain amount of alternative
supply, such as 20 percent of the
contracted energy demand for
three years. Suppliers can meet
their obligation through different
options such as (i) interruptible
contracts with their consumers,
(ii) volumes in storage, or (iii)
option contracts with other
domestic and foreign suppliers.
Europe's suppliers would need to
make sure that the transport
capacities – pipelines and termi-
nals – needed to deliver the
corresponding volumes to cus-
tomers are available.
Furthermore, ‘reserve supplies’
could not be met by options
involving pivotal suppliers/infra-
structure. That is, holding an
option for additional supplies
from Russia would not qualify as
‘reserve supplies’. To ensure this,
pivotal suppliers/infrastructure
will have to be identified. In case a
supplier finds itself in a situation
in which all existing infrastructure
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is either already used or pivotal, it
will have to invest in new infra-
structure. Suppliers would only be
able to draw on these ‘reserve
supplies’ in security crises follow-
ing an official declaration. This
system, the cost of which the
domestic suppliers will largely
pass through to their customers,
should ensure security of supply
for all at lowest cost and without
undermining the internal market.
Such an approach would obvi-
ously have distributive effects.
Consumers in well-connected
regions that face a very limited
risk of supply disruptions will
have to pay for ‘their’ share of
reserves, which most likely only
their less well-connected neigh-
bours might need. But this
solidarity will not wash away
regional differences arising from
different infrastructure endow-
ments because suppliers in areas
with less-developed infrastruc-
ture will find it more costly to
ensure the level of supply secu-
rity. This is efficient because it
provides an incentive against
locating the most vulnerable sec-
tors in vulnerable markets. For
example, a chemical plant in
Cyprus will only get an interrupt-
ible contract because no supplier
could affordably secure the
required reserve capacities.
RES-INNOVATION TARGET 
Since the EU 20 percent target for
renewables was decided, some of
the reasons for investing in
renewables have become less
urgent. There is less risk that
fossil fuels will run out quickly,
more reliable suppliers are enter-
ing the global energy market22 and
a global agreement to mitigate
greenhouse gases seems distant.
Nevertheless, in the longer-term,
issues such as dependence on
imports from uncertain sources
and rising hydrocarbon costs will
return. Most importantly, afford-
able decarbonisation of the
energy sector will require compet-
itive renewable energy sources
(RES).
Consequently, the focus of
renewables support should shift
from a deployment target that
encourages the quick roll-out of
the cheapest currently renewable
technology, to an ambitious inno-
vation target that encourages
investment to cut the cost of RES.
If successful, an innovation target
will be the largest possible contri-
bution of Europe (and its
partners) to saving the global cli-
mate, and might be instrumental
in developing a competitive edge
in what will become a major global
market23.
It is difficult to establish the opti-
mal size, selection, balance and
timing of 'push' and 'pull' meas-
ures – for example, public R&D
support, or feed-in tariffs to create
demand for a new technology.
Zachmann et al (2014) indicate
that both public support to boost
innovation and the timing of
instruments matters. It is not
massive actual deployment24, but
the prospect of deployment that
is the carrot for industry to com-
mercialise the technologies
developed through publicly-sup-
ported R&D. A long-term
deployment target – such as the
20 percent for 2020 – is helpful,
not least because it incentivises
innovation and investment in
complementary technologies
such as storage or networks. How-
absolute annual reduc-
tion will increase from
38,264,246 today to
48,380,081 after 2020.
17. Introducing the
steeper reduction factor
would encourage
saving some additional
150 million tonnes of
CO2 before 2020 and
reduce the overall allo-
cation by 1.5 billion
tonnes of CO2 by 2050.
18. For practical rea-
sons this cannot be
done directly (ie not
every car should fall
under the ETS), but
through indirect meas-
ures such as an
emission-price related
fuel tax component.
19. The Commission
itself states that the
potential impacts of
this mechanism on the
carbon price cannot be
modelled (CDC Climat
Research, 2014)
20. The ‘target level’,
the exercise year and
the volume would be
the result of a political
compromise.
21. Supply security
encompasses the
resilience of the techni-
cal system (eg no
blackouts) and the abil-
ity of Europe to ensure
stable energy supplies
despite foreign shocks.
Given that technical
supply security should
ever, the deployment target
should be broken down to tech-
nology-specific targets and
developed as part of an innova-
tion policy that optimally
supports a broad portfolio of tech-
nologies at different stages of
maturity. A revised Strategic
Energy Technology Plan25 could
form the basis for defining meas-
ures and allocating support to
technologies.
The current and envisaged renew-
ables policies are not focused on
innovation. Europe currently
spends on relevant R&D about a
hundredth of what it spends on
renewables deployment (Figure
3)26. It does not integrate its
deployment and R&D policies into
a strategic innovation policy and
does not coordinate its deploy-
ment policies across borders.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
The key tool to ensure efficient
energy usage is confronting all
users with market-based price
signals. Wasteful usage does not
only refer to using more energy to
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be safeguarded by the
market design and that
Europe imports more than
half of its energy needs ,
we focus on the later.
22. For example,
liquefied natural gas
exports from the US and
Australia.
23. Primary consump-
tion of oil, natural gas
and coal amounts to
about 6 percent of global
GDP. Adding the value of
existing non-fossil elec-
tricity production (about
$2 trillion), energy
downstream cost and
demand side appliances,
it is likely that a global
market for new energy
technologies would
amount to more than 10
percent of world GDP.
24. Over-generous sup-
port in fact appears to
reduce producers’ incen-
tives to aggressively
compete on innovation.
The ten largest solar
panel producers all
spend below 5 percent
on R&D, compared to 10-
20 percent in the
semiconductors sector
(www.pvtech.org/friday_f
ocus/friday_focus_rd_spen
ding_analysis_of_top_10_pv
_module_manufacturers).
25. For example Zach-
mann et al (2012) and
Ruester et al (2013).
26. Public spending on
deployment has been
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produce a certain good, but also
artificially maintaining a speciali-
sation in energy-intensive goods.
As Europe should not strive to
subsidise labour costs to make
the European textile industry
competitive with Asia, Europe
should not subsidise energy
costs to make European alu-
minium production competitive
with the US, especially as defend-
ing energy-intensive sectors at all
cost locks in high energy con-
sumption and implies that Europe
needs to draw on more expensive
supplies for all other sectors.
Beyond the issue of prices, the
question is if energy efficiency
needs to be regulated and if this
should be done at European level.
The need for regulation is often
deduced from the finding that
even efficiency measures with
positive net present values are
not delivered by the market27. As
energy efficiency is an issue in
virtually all sectors, there is a
myriad of existing and proposed
measures. So, energy efficiency
policies can be welfare enhanc-
ing, but their efficiency depends
on their design.
The same holds for the question
of subsidiarity. The obvious argu-
ment for a European energy
efficiency policy is its interde-
pendence with the single market.
National product energy-effi-
ciency standards, national
energy-efficiency schemes for
energy companies or even dis-
torting energy taxes could weigh
on the single market’s integrity.
On the other hand, national regu-
latory environments and
structures for important energy
consuming sectors (eg buildings)
differ markedly. This might make
a one-size-fits-all European
energy efficiency policy very inef-
ficient in these fields.
So the somewhat generic conclu-
sion on energy efficiency is that
individual market failures should
be addressed by the most effi-
cient measures at the right level
of government. For the broad port-
folio of regional, national and
European policies that is neces-
sary, a binding EU 2030 energy
consumption target is not well
suited. It neither addresses who
has to deliver nor does it properly
take economic developments into
account. To benchmark energy-
efficiency policies we would
suggest a bottom-up approach.
Based on the ex-post evaluation
of each individual energy effi-
ciency policy, the incentivised
demand reduction and the corre-
sponding policy cost should be
reported. For example, the
energy-efficiency loans in Ger-
many in 2011 had an estimated
cost of about €1 billion and
encouraged annual savings of 0.1
million tonnes of oil equivalent
(Mtoe).
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Source: Bruegel based on IEA and Datastream. Note: Net deployment costs are
calculated as the difference between the deployment costs and the net present value
of the future electricity generated. RD&D = research, development and demonstration.
Figure 3: Deployment versus RD&D expenditure for solar (left panel)
and wind (right panel) in 2010 in six EU countries (€ millions)
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Two targets would then serve to
benchmark the success of the
overall policy framework up to
2030: one for total incentivised
energy savings (eg more than
400 Mtoe of induced energy sav-
ings between 2020 and 2030)
and one for total energy effi-
ciency policy cost (eg less than
€100 billion). This target might be
broken down by member state (or
even to sub-national level) and
even made binding.
CONCLUSION
Policy and market failures in the
energy sector are common. There
is too little energy saving, too little
investment in security and inno-
vation and emissions are too
This would be a radical step-
change in European energy and
climate policy, but so were the
2020 targets. But in planning for
2030, Europe cannot avoid
substantially revising the
governance of its energy sector,
without compromising on
security of supply, sustainability
and competitiveness.
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two orders of magnitude
larger (in 2010 about
€48 billion in the five
largest EU countries in
2010) than spending on
RD&D support (about
€315 million).
27. Reasons discussed
are myopic preferences
of consumers or split
incentives (eg between
landlords and tenants).
See for example Kolev et
al (2012).
high. Governments tend to over-
invest in big supply projects and
use energy-sector regulation for
other national policy purposes,
preferring to solve the issues of
the day instead of addressing the
structural problems.
The European 2030 framework
should strive to address the
market failures without falling for
the government failures.
Essential elements will be well-
designed European markets for
emissions, electricity supply and
gas security of supply. Better
policy frameworks are also
needed to encourage energy
efficiency and innovation in low-
carbon energy technologies.
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